What is a Hypothec?
A hypothec is a right afforded to a creditor in terms of our law of credit security, which entitles the creditor to retain power or control of a thing owned by the debtor until the obligation owed by the debtor to the creditor has been satisfied. The manner of control of the thing, the times at which the creditor is entitled to exercise that control and the manner in which the creditor needs to assert his right to that control, differ from one hypothec to the next. The idea behind a hypothec is to give a creditor security for the repayment of the loan or the satisfaction of the obligation owed to the creditor by the debtor.
Perfection refers to any action that the law requires the creditor must take in order to “activate” its credit security right to take possession of the debtor’s property that is subject to the hypothec; and to sell that property to satisfy the debtor’s obligation to the creditor. Perfection is required in most (but not) all types of credit security arrangements. In most cases, permission from the court is required before the creditor can take possession of the object of security.
The creditor is entitled, if the debtor defaults, to sell the object of value that is subject to the pledge to satisfy the debt or obligation owed to the creditor by the debtor. In this type of hypothec, because the debtor has voluntarily given up possession of the object of value to the creditor and the creditor is in possession of it already, the creditor does not need to obtain a court order authorising the taking of possession of the object and the sale of it to satisfy the debt. However, there are strict rules that govern the manner in which the sale must occur, to protect the debtor from abuse of the system by the creditor.
The aforementioned act provides that the nature of the hypothec created is essentially the same as a pledge created in terms of our common law, with certain crucial differences. The most important one being that the creditor does not take the object of security into its physical possession, but the law deems the creditor to have done so to create a fictional pledge. This type of hypothec is perfected by the creditor applying to court for permission to take possession of the object that is the subject of the notarial bond, and to sell it to satisfy the obligation or debt owed to the creditor by the debtor.
In all of these cases, the purpose of the creditor’s notification of its right in that item is to ensure that other creditors are not misled by the debtor into providing further credit to the debtor based on that same item of security. It further ensures that the first debtor has stronger rights to that item of security than any other creditors that might subsequently acquire, if the debtor has disingenuously held out to other creditors that the item of security in question is available to provide security to them.
In relation to mortgage bonds and notarial bonds, the act of perfection occurs when the creditor makes application to, and is granted an order by, a court to the extent that the creditor can take the property concerned into its possession and sell it to satisfy the debt owed the creditor by the debtor.
This is because in our law, self-help or vigilantism is frowned upon, and were a creditor to seize property in possession of a debtor without the consent of that debtor or a court order authorising seizure, such conduct would be unlawful, even if the creditor had a security right in respect to the property concerned.
In the case of a common law pledge, the debtor has already voluntarily placed the creditor in possession of the property concerned and so there is no need for a court order, perfection having occurred when the debtor voluntarily relinquished control of the property to the creditor.The wording of section 118(3) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act provides only that a municipality has a hypothec over the property concerned for all charges incurred in connection with it. The Act itself is not clear on precisely how a creditor needs to go about perfecting its hypothec in terms of section 118. It most certainly does not give the municipality any special rights or preferences to exercise its hypothec in any manner other than in accordance with the general principles of our law of credit security.
Based on the general principals described above that apply to hypothecs, the authors are of the view that in terms of our law of credit security, a municipality needs to follow the steps described below to exercise its hypothec:
To regard the municipality as having perfected a hypothec before the attachment occurs in the deeds office (ie once a court order is granted attaching a property but without any action being taken by the municipality to register its hypothec against the property in the deeds office) would be to ignore the established principles of credit security in our law.
When the municipality makes application to the court for the attachments and sale of property concerned, the owner of the property (who may or may not be the person who incurred the municipal charges that the municipality is seeking to recover by the sale of the property) will then have the opportunity to put any defences before the court as to why the property should not be sold to defray those expenses. This ensures that the municipality does not take the law into its own hands and seize the property from the property owner, without following the due process of obtaining a court order authorising seizure.
Observation on the termination of hypothecs
The rules that regulate hypothecs ensure that no third party who is innocent of the debt owed by the debtor to the creditor becomes liable for that debt when acquiring the item of security from the debtor, unless the third party has expressly agreed to take over the debt.
In the cases of pledge, for example, a creditor would sell the item of security in order to satisfy the debt owed by it to the debtor, thus discharging the debtors’ debt and passing transfer of the item of security to the purchaser thereof, free of the debt.
In the case of mortgage bonds, the mortgage bond has to be cancelled in the deeds office before such time as the property can be transferred to the successor in title thereof, unless the successor in title agrees to take over the debtors’ liability to the creditor. In that case, the property is transferred to the successor entitled thereto simultaneous to either a substitution of the debtor for the third party transferee in terms of the mortgage bond, or the cancellation of the mortgage bond. In the case of a notarial bond, the same principals apply as in relation to a mortgage bond. In all of these cases, the law prevents an innocent third party who acquires the property from becoming liable for the prior owner’s liability to the creditor – unless the transferee agrees.
The authors thus question how the court in the Mitchell case could have reached the conclusion that when the property is transferred from the debtor to an innocent third party, the hypothec could “survive transfer” and be enforced against that innocent third party, when in terms of all (or at least most) other hypothecs there is no provision for this, unless the third party acquiring the property expressly agrees to take on that liability.
The authors argue that at the very least, for section 118, it cannot reasonably be understood in terms of our law of credit security that the hypothec should “survive transfer” and be enforceable against an innocent third party successor in title unless at the very least the municipality has perfected its hypothec in the manner described above and in that manner notified the entire world of the existence of its hypothec.
A purchaser wishing to acquire the property once the hypothec has been perfected and an interdict has been registered against the property for the judgment debt concerned, would then have notice of the existence of the hypothec and the property would not be able to be transferred to that purchaser free of the hypothec unless that hypothec were cancelled in the deeds office first.
As the deeds office rules and regulations require that once an interdict has been registered against the property, it must be uplifted before the property can be transferred to a subsequent owner, the practical effect of the registration of the interdict (ie the perfection of the municipality’s hypothec) would be that the municipality would need to be paid all amounts outstanding (or agree to a payment arrangement for same) before the interdict could be uplifted by the deeds office and the property could be transferred to the purchaser concerned, meaning that the purchaser concerned would always receive the property free of the hypothec unless the purchaser has agreed to take over the liability.
It is conceivable that a purchaser acquiring a property subject to a hypothec in terms of section 118 would agree to take transfer of that property subject to the hypothec (and accordingly subject to the municipality’s rights to attach and sell that property to satisfy the debt owed to it by the debtor who was not the purchaser). This could be achieved by the purchaser expressly agreeing in the offer to purchase to take over the debtor’s liability to the municipality, and by the municipality agreeing to uplift the interdict on this basis – which would presumably only happen if the municipality had secured some sort of guarantee or repayment plan from the new owner in respects of the outstanding debt.
The authors are of the view that the court’s ruling in the Mitchell and Mathabathe (*Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 (4) SA 319 (SCA) at 325) judgments did not adequately or properly investigate the qualities of hypothecs in terms of our law of credit security, and that this lead to the incorrect interpretation of section 118 as creating a hypothec in favour of a municipality that “survives transfer”.
In our view, such a hypothec should firstly not survive transfer unless the successor in title has expressly agreed to take on the liability to the municipality.
Secondly, in our view the municipality has not perfected its hypothec until it has notified the public at large of the existence of the hypothec by way of registration in the deeds office of an interdict attaching the property in favour of the municipality, which simultaneously prevents transfer of that property to a successor until such time as the debt owed to the municipality has been paid in full.
This protects both the creditor and an innocent purchaser. Understanding and interpreting section 118 as described in this article would bring the operation of the section 118 municipal hypothec within the ambits of the normal operation of hypothecs in terms of our law of credit security, and would rationalise the principles applicable to it with all other hypothecs that exist in terms of our law of credit security. Interpreting section 118 in any other way is (in the authors view) nonsensical and legally incorrect.
